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WHOSE FEDERALISM? 
Michael G. Collins* 
"It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our Federal-
ism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occu-
pies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its 
future."t When Justice Black invokes the voices of the constitu-
tional Elders as he did in Younger v. Harris, perhaps the safest in-
stinct is not to second-guess the attribution. But was there ever 
such a slogan? Obviously, the fears of excessive centralization of 
governmental power and the tensions between national and local 
decisionmaking have had a "highly important place in our Nation's 
history and its future,'' whether or not any such label or shorthand 
was ever used to identify those concerns. But at the purely rhetori-
cal level, the all-purpose slogan "Our Federalism" probably does 
not have as ancient a pedigree as Justice Black would have liked. 
As a constitutional sound-bite, the phrase "our federalism" 
seems to have been slipped into Supreme Court discourse by none 
other than Justice Black's nemesis, Felix Frankfurter. Indeed, the 
phrase was introduced almost contemporaneously with Justice 
Frankfurter's arrival on the Court. Frankfurter was sworn in as an 
Associate Justice on January 30, 1939, and scarcely a month later 
the first opinion under his name was announced. There, on page 
378 of the justly forgotten decision in Hale v. Bimco Trading,2 was 
the phrase in the first of many appearances. In referring to the 
American scheme of government, Justice Frankfurter tagged it "our 
complicated federalism."J Luckily for the slogan's future, the quali-
fying adjective did not long survive. The more familiar (and less 
complicated) "our federalism" arrived in a Frankfurter dissent is-
sued about two weeks after Bimco, in Texas v. Florida.4 In a discus-
• Associate Professor, Tulane University School of Law. 
I. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). 
2. 306 u.s. 375 (1939). 
3. 306 U.S. at 378. The opinion included a discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act (28 
U.S.C. § 2283), which Justice Frankfurter referred to as "an historical mechanism for achiev-
ing harmony in one phase of our complicated federalism by avoiding needless friction be-
tween two systems of courts having potential jurisdiction over the same subject matter." Id. 
He concluded that the Act did not apply to the case. 
4. 306 u.s. 398 (1939). 
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sion of the high court's original jurisdiction, Frankfurter wrote: 
"The authority which the Constitution has committed to this court 
over 'Controversies between two or more States,' serves important 
ends in the working of our federalism. "s A slogan was born. 
"Our federalism" was invoked two more times by Frankfurter 
in 1939: once in concurrence6 just two weeks after Texas v. Florida, 
and once for the Court later that year.7 Clearly, Frankfurter was 
taken with the phrase. But at first, no one else seems to have been. 
Over the next three decades-and indeed until his departure from 
the bench in 1962-few of the Justices other than Frankfurter in-
voked the "our federalism" phrase. Through the 1930s and 1940s, 
Frankfurter had a virtual monopoly on its use.s The only mention 
of "our federalism" by another member of the Court during this 
time occurred when Justice Roberts borrowed the phrase in his dis-
sent in Screws v. United States9-a dissent in which Justice Frank-
furter joined.w It was not until the late 1950s that others made 
even sporadic use of the slogan, and even then it was chiefly the 
property of Justice Frankfurter. 11 And in the early 1960s, while 
Frankfurter remained on the Court, he alone employed the 
phrase.12 It was only after his departure that others picked up 
5. 306 U.S. at 428 (dissenting opinion). 
6. See Graws v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 490 (1939). That part of 
Frankfurter's opinion containing the "our federalism" language was later quoted by Justice 
Butler in a footnote in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 294 n.l5 (1939). 
7. See Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 84 (1939). 
8. During this period, Frankfurter invoked it more often in dissent (five times-5ee 
Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 299 (1949); Williams v. Austrian, 331 
U.S. 642, 663 (1947); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947); Morris v. 
Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 564 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 552 (1945)) than in opinions for 
the Court (four times-Central Greyhound Lines. Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 660 (1948); 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945); Williams v. North Cora/ina, 325 U.S. 
226, 233 (1945); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 141 (1941)). See also State 
Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 184 (1942) (concurring opinion). 
9. 325 u.s. 91, 142 (1945). 
10. Screws, 325 U.S. at 138. See also above at note 6 (noting Justice Butler's quotation 
of Frankfurter's language that included the "our federalism" phrase). 
11. "Our federalism" shows up in fifteen cases in the 1950s including six times in the 
spring of 1959 alone (Westlaw search June 15, 1991, "our federalism," data base S.Ct.)--see 
Louisiana Power d Light v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959); Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 279 (1959); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 129 n.9 (1959); New York v. 
O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 11 (1959); Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 374 
(1959). Frankfurter was responsible for all but four of the fifteen appearances in the 1950s 
and he was responsible for each of the six appearances in the bountiful spring of '59. The 
only four non-Frankfurter uses in the 1950-1959 period were by Justice Jackson in Public 
Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952); Justice Harlan in Hoag v. New Jersey, 
356 U.S. 464,468 (1958); Justice Harlan again in Cicenia v. Lo Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958); 
and Justice Brennan in A./lied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 533 (1959) (concur-
ring opinion). 
12. The Frankfurter "our federalism" opinions of the 1960s are Kesler v. Dept. of Public 
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where he had left off, the phrase appearing a dozen more times 
before the decision in Younger v. Ha"is.IJ Interestingly, Justice 
Black, who had been on the Court for well over thirty years when 
he wrote the opinion in Younger, and whose arrival preceded 
Frankfurter's by fifteen months, had never made use of the phrase 
in any of his opinions prior to Younger itself.I4 
It may be hard to imagine that the phrase "our federalism" 
was not used by the Court before Frankfurter first used it in 1939, 
but if the technology of Lexis and W estlaw may be believed, not 
even the term "federalism" -positively ubiquitous by today's stan-
dards-had appeared in any Supreme Court opinion before the 
1939 decision in Bimco. Rightly called "the most eloquent expo-
nent of the value of federalism in the past fifty years" Is it is fitting 
that Frankfurter was the initial and most frequent user of the "fed-
eralism" word while he was on the Court. Indeed, in the first two 
decades during which Frankfurter was on the bench hardly anyone 
else ever used the term.I6 Usage by other Justices picked up a little 
in the 1950s,l7 but it nearly tripled over that in the 196Qs,Is and 
then it doubled yet again in the next decadei9-the "new federal-
Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 172 (1962); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 546 (1961); Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 237, 242 (1961) (dissenting opinion); and Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 233 (1960) (dissenting opinion). 
13. Westlaw search June 15, 1991, "federalism," data base S.Ct. 
14. Well, hardly ever. In his dissent in Kesler v. DepL of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 
184 (1962), Justice Black quoted from Frankfurter's majority opinion in that same case in 
which Frankfurter had referred to the "complicated demands of our federalism." Black, 
however, quoted the language in dissent only to argue that the case could not be decided by 
reference to any such considerations. If Kesler counts as the first instance of Black's use of 
the phrase in an opinion, it was, interestingly, Frankfurter's last. 
15. Robert C. Post, Justice Brennan and Federalism, 7 Const. Comm. 227, 233 (1990). 
16. Other than Frankfurter, only Justices Rutledge and Reed ever employed the word 
"federalism" in the decades of the 1930s and 40s (apart, of course, from Justice Roberts's solo 
use of "our federalism" in Screws, (cited in note 9)). Reed used it in Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947), where he referred to the "constitutional doctrine of federalism." Rut-
ledge used the word "federalism" three times in the 1940s. See United States v. Scophony 
Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 803 n.l2 (1948); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 418 
(1946); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 116 (1945) (concurring opinion). In Screws, 
Justice Rutledge made what was apparently the Court's first reference to "dual federalism"-
an almost-as-famous constitutional sound bite as "our federalism." See EdwardS. Corwin, 
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. I (1950). Actually, among article III users of 
the federalism word in judicial opinions, Frankfurter was beaten to the punch by Judge Wil-
liam Clark. See United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 454 (D.N.J. 1937) ("our hobby of 
comparative federalism"); United States v. Flegenheimer, 14 F. Supp. 584, 586 (D.N.J. 1935). 
17. "Federalism" (including its incorporation in "our federalism") appeared in twenty-
four cases in the 1950s. Westlaw search June 15, 1991, "federalism," data base S.Ct. 
18. "Federalism" (including its incorporation in "our federalism") appeared in sixty-
two cases in the 1960s. Id. 
19. "Federalism" (including its incorporation in "our federalism") appeared in 122 
cases in the 1970s. Id. 
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ism"2° decade of Younger v. Harris. And "federalism," like "our 
federalism," has since shown no signs of disappearing from the 
Court's vocabulary.21 
More interesting, perhaps, is the politically neutral use that 
Frankfurter often made of the terms "federalism" and "our federal-
ism." Today, federalism is pretty much a household word among 
constitutional insiders-a conceptual shorthand for the assump-
tions underlying the proper relationship or balance of power be-
tween the states and the national government. As Richard Stewart 
has put it: "Federalism seeks to maintain political decentralization 
and social diversity while simultaneously promoting national meas-
ures to meet national needs and prevent localized oppression. "22 
Commentators speak of "federalism" as one would speak of other 
political "-isms," and they write about the "values" of federalism,2J 
the "policy" of federalism,24 or the "doctrine" of federalism.2s And 
while it represents a normative concept, the precise contours of 
"federalism" are the subject of continuing and contentious debate.26 
"Our Federalism" as it is currently used is just another way of re-
ferring to "our notions offederalism"27 or (as Justice Douglas chose 
to call it in his Younger dissent): "American federalism."2s And 
for Justice Black, that concept meant: 
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact 
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state 
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National 
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are 
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate 
20. See Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1191 (1977). 
21. "Federalism" (including its incorporation in "our federalism") appeared in 142 
cases in the 1980s. Westlaw search June 15, 1991, "federalism," data base S.Ct. Opinions 
from the Court's 1990-91 Term were virtually awash in the rhetoric of federalism. See, e.g., 
Coleman Y. Thompson, Ill S.Ct. 2546 (1991) (in a decision that appropriately began "This is 
a case about federalism," the word "federalism" appears a total of eighteen times in the 
various opinions of the Justices); City of Columbia Y. OMNI Outdoor Ad-vertising, Inc., 111 
S.Ct. 1344 (1991) (eight times); Harme/in Y. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991) (five times). 
22. Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 917, 917 (1985). 
23. A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recur-
rence to Fundamental Principles, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 789, 789 (1985). 
24. Mark Tushnet, General Principles of the ReYision of Federal Jurisdiction: A. Political 
Analysis, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 621, 623-24 (1990) ("the policy that national interests ought not 
be advanced at an excessive cost to the commitment of substantial policymaking power to the 
states, a policy Justice Black labelled 'Our Federalism.' ") 
25. Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 320 (West, 4th eel. 1983). 
26. See, e.g., Coleman Y. Thompson, Ill S.Ct. 2546, 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that federalism has "no inherent normative value"); cf. Post, 7 Const. Comm. at 227 
(cited in note 15) (discussing Justice Brennan's rights-reinforcing view of federalism). 
27. Community Communications Co. Y. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 69 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
28. Younger Y. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 60 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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ways.29 
But Frankfurter's uses of the terms "federalism" and "our fed-
eralism" were perceptibly different from, and much more modest 
than, these more familiar uses. When Frankfurter used them, he 
often spoke of "federalism" not as a concept or in the abstract. In-
stead (and perhaps oddly from our current perspective) he spoke of 
our system of government as "a federalism" -a term that he used to 
describe any system of government in which power was divided be-
tween a central government and regional or state governments. 
"[W]e are a federalism,"Jo said Frankfurter in 1939, which was to 
say only that our government was a "federal" one. Even more in-
terestingly, he also regularly spoke of "federalisms" in the plural, by 
which again he appears to have meant no more than to stick a ge-
neric label on the class of governments in which power was diffused 
between central and local sovereignties. The other federalisms that 
Frankfurter offered up as examples were the governments of Can-
ada and Australia, which he referred to as "the two other great 
English federalisms."JI In these contexts, federalism was not so 
much a doctrine; rather it was a kind of government.J2 This de-
scriptive use of the term seemed to be an accepted one in academic 
circles at the time, as Frankfurter's citation to the work of Professor 
Jane Clark (who used the term in a similar manner) bears out.JJ 
This is not to say that Frankfurter (or his brethren) did not use 
the word in the more normative or conceptual sense in which it is 
customarily used today; it appears that they did.J4 It is just that 
29. ld. at 44. 
30. Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 488 (1939) (concurring opinion); 
see also Irwin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 407 (1959) (dissenting opinion) (referring to our govern-
ment as "a constitutional federalism"). 
31. Graves, 306 U.S. at 490; see also Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958) 
(discussing some of the differences "between federalisms"). 
32. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 325-26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). Of course, at some level, governmental arrangements (e.g., a federalism or a democ-
racy) and the ideas that inform them (i.e., "federalism," or "democracy") are inseparable. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of this discussion, the two uses of the terms can fairly be distin-
guished from one another. 
33. See Jane Perry Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism 294 (Columbia U. Press, 1938). 
Professor Clark, in a book on state-federal relations nearly contemporaneous with Frank-
furter's own elevation to the Court, observed that the "devices of [state-federal] cooperation, 
like the federalism of which they are a part, are frequently complex, cumbersome, and un-
wieldy." ld. Clark thanks Frankfurter in the Preface to her book. See id. at xiii; see also 
below at note 66. 
34. See, e.g., Farmers Educational & Coop. Union v. WDA Y. Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 536 
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (referring to "the binding principle of federalism"); 
United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing "our 
conception of federalism"); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532 (1959) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to the Constitution as "an instrument of federalism"); see 
also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1946) (Reed, J.); Screws v. United States, 325 
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Frankfurter had a particular predilection for using it in this now 
somewhat more unusual and less well-remembered manner. When 
Frankfurter used "federalism" in combination with "our" (or with 
the definite or indefinite article), it was invariably used in a nonab-
stract, descriptive manner. In these contexts, Frankfurter rarely 
suggested that there was anything peculiar or unique-as among 
federal governments-about "a federalism like ours"Js (as he once 
called it in a variation of his theme). Rather, the point to be made 
was that "ours" was like "the two other great English federal-
isms"36 and that similar problems befell all such governments. 
Thus, the reference to "our federalism" was used, initially at least, 
as a way for Frankfurter to show our kinship to their federalisms. 
"The very federalism of our structure"J7made us like them. In this 
respect, the phrase was not much of a slogan at all; nor was it in-
voked to identify a doctrine or a principle, or even to suggest the 
desirability of diffused governmental power. Rather, Frankfurter's 
version of "our federalism" seems to have been no more than a sub-
stitute way of saying "our federation"Js or "our federal system" 
(which was, in its basic outlines, like other federal systems).39 The 
more politically charged use of the phrase would come later, in 
opinions by other Justices, when Frankfurter was off the bench. 
While it seems clear that Frankfurter coined the particular 
combination of words for the Court, it was not the first time that he 
had used it in print. For example, he had employed the phrase as a 
professor at Harvard Law School in his book on the Commerce 
Clause, which came out only two years before his arrival on the 
Court.40 In it, he observed that if Chief Justices Taney's and Mar-
shall's opinions "hung together" in some measure, "it is because the 
work of both men was infused with a philosophy regarding our fed-
U.S. 91, 116 (Rutledge, J., concurring). I have discovered no opinion of Justice Black's (with 
perhaps one exception-see above at note 14), that used the federalism word in either of its 
possible senses prior to Younger v. Harris (and its incorporation in "Our Federalism"). 
35. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 449 (1948) (dissenting opinion). 
36. See footnote 31. 
37. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 803 n.12 (1948) (Rut-
ledge, J.). 
38. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949) (Jackson, J.) 
(referring to the "long settled principles of our Federation"). 
39. The phrase "our federal system" has a modestly longer pedigree dating from the 
nineteenth century. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 491 (1856) 
(Opinion of Daniel, J.) (referring to James Madison as the "artifex maximus of our federal 
system"); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling cl Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564 
(1851); Wheaton v. Grigg, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834); see also Felix Frankfurter, Distri-
bution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Corn. L.Q. 499, 503 
(1928) (referring to "our federal scheme"). 
40. Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney, and Waite 66 (U. 
N.C. Press, 1937). 
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eralism as a means to an ordered social life-and the Court as a 
means of regulating the federalism."4I Similarly, Frankfurter's 
1938 book on Justice Holmes veritably bristles with references to 
"our federalism"42 and to the problems of our and the other "Eng-
lish speaking federalisms"43 (this time including India). Even as 
early as 1929, in an article for the New Republic, Frankfurter had 
referred to the Supreme Court as "the ultimate tribunal in our 
federalism." 44 
In addition, in Frankfurter's many uses of "our federalism," 
even the intonation of the words seems different from Justice 
Black's later use of them. When Frankfurter talks of "the constitu-
tional law of our federalism"4s or "the dual judicial system in our 
federalism,"46 or "the complexities (or "actual workings")47 of our 
federalism,"4s their use seems almost casual. Compare this with 
Justice Black in Younger v. Harris: Not only does Black capitalize 
"Our Federalism," but he embalms the words in quotation marks 
and calls them (for the first time) a "slogan." On reading "this slo-
gan, 'Our Federalism,' " the phrase takes on a kind of entity status. 
It becomes a concept that can be talked about as a separate thing-
in-itself-a concept that has legitimacy and that can therefore be 
invoked to justify particular legal results. The very next Term, it 
was easy for the Court to affirm that Younger had been decided on 
"the 'policy' ground of 'Our Federalism.' "49 As a consequence, it 
is almost hard to read those earlier, more innocent uses of the same 
words by Justice Frankfurter without superimposing the echo of 
Justice Black's own articulation of them (and without mentally cap-
italizing the "0" and the "F"). But to do so in most cases seems 
inappropriate and noticeably awkward.so 
By contrast to Frankfurter's usage, the slogan "Our Federal-
ism,'' as used in a case like Younger v. Harris, suggests a particular 
41. ld. 
42. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court ch. 3 (Harv. U. 
Press, 1938). 
43. ld. at 90. See also Philip Kurland, ed., Of Law and Life & Other Things that Mat-
ter: Papers and Addresses of Felix Frankfurter 1956-/963, 126 (Harv. U. Press, 1967) (refer-
ring to "other federalisms"); id. at 124 ("ours is a federalism"). 
44. The Federal Courts, 58 New Republic 273, 274 (April 24, 1929). 
45. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 129 (1959). 
46. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 546 (1961). 
47. Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 490 (1939). 
48. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) (separate opinion). See also Felix Frank-
furter & James Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in 
the Federal Judicial System, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1129 (1927) ("these political problems 
will persist as long as our federalism endures"). 
49. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231 (1972). 
SO. Consider: "[T]he dual judicial system in 'Our Federalism;'" "the ultimate tribunal 
in 'Our Federalism;'" or "the Constitutional law of 'Our Federalism;'" and so on. 
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spin on the proper adjustment of state-federal power. By invoking 
the Framers of 1787, Justice Black directs the reader's attention to a 
point prior to the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, and 
away from a second group of Reconstruction era Framers who per-
manently altered the antebellum notions of federalism to which Jus-
tice Black paid homage. By attributing the "slogan" to the time of 
(original) constitutional creation, Black endows "Our Federalism" 
with a close-to-textual status which-for a literalist like Justice 
Black, at least--one might suppose to have an immediate and obvi-
ous meaning. The reader of the opinion in Younger is therefore led 
to believe that the contours of state-federal relations evoked by the 
phrase "Our Federalism" are ones that were set in place long ago in 
some Golden Age of more modest national powers. One therefore 
readily lumps the words, as Justice Black did in Younger, with other 
words suggestive of deference to state judicial functioning-despite 
his disclaimer that he was not endorsing "blind deference" to 
"States' Rights."s1 And if decisions from the Court's 1990-91 Term 
are any indication, "federalism" and "our federalism" have grown 
to become rhetorically and emotionally charged words that invoke 
the (political) correctness of deferring to state action in many areas 
of constitutional law, often at the expense of enforcement of na-
tional laws and ultimately at the expense of individual rights.s2 
They are now words that offer a substitute for analysis-words that 
can be called upon to justify convenient results.s3 
It may not be possible fully to account for the shift in emphasis 
and the different use of the words "our federalism" in Younger. But 
what seems to have happened is that Justice Black-who was using 
the words on his own for the first time-conflated two verbal 
events. One the one hand, "federalism" as a normative or concep-
tual term had become an accepted part of high court discourse 
through the 1950s and 1960s. And, on the other hand, there were 
those many Frankfurter opinions that-while using the federalism 
51. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) (referring to 
Younger's principles of "equity, comity and federalism"); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sov-
ereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1425-26, 1520 (1987) (noting that "federalism" 
and "Our Federalism" now serve as code words for states' rights). 
52. See cases cited above at note 21; see also Coleman v. Thompson, Ill S. Ct. 2546, 
2569-71 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had adopted a wooden 
reading of federalism that would endorse deference to state decisionmaking in virtually every 
state-federal conflict). 
53. It is ironic that the (supposedly) historical grounded rhetoric of "Our Federalism" 
has enabled the Court to justify conservative judicial activism even where "history" itself 
would appear to argue for a different result. See e.g., Riverside County v. McLaughlin, Ill 
S.Ct. 1661, 1671-73 (1991) (forty-eight hour illegal detention upheld in part because of "de-
mands of federalism" and despite a compelling historical argument to the contrary (see id. at 
1671-73) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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word in a descriptive sense-had stuck on the possessive "our" sim-
ply to remind the reader whose federal system (or whose federation) 
was being discussed. What Black did was to take the old unexcep-
tionable word combination-our + federalism-in which federal-
ism was used in its descriptive sense, and to use it now with 
federalism in its more conceptual or normative sense. In so doing, 
Black created a phrase the likes of which had not been seen before 
in the Court's opinions.s4 At the rhetorical level, the feat was re-
markably successful. Since Younger, "Our Federalism" has seldom 
been used except in the sense in which Black had newly christened 
it-as a way of referring to our concerns for harmonious state-fed-
eral relations, and with more than a hint of special solicitude for 
states' rights.ss 
That Justice Black had manipulated (or simply confused) some 
of the Court's earlier language seems apparent. But more curious is 
his insistence that "Our Federalism" was a slogan with a pedigree. 
Not even the bare combination of words had materialized in any 
opinion on the Court prior to 1939, and Black's own version was 
innovation well beyond that. Even if he misunderstood (or played a 
little fast and loose with) the Frankfurter version, it is dumb-
founding that he should have made such an assumption about its 
ancestry. A good constitutional fundamentalist like Justice Black 
might have thought to provide some historical or textual support to 
prove the slogan's antiquity if he had had any-although his will-
ingness to place his faith in the existence and antiquity of the phrase 
may itself bear witness to his basic fundamentalism and "transcen-
dent constitutional piety."s6 
54. In fairness to Justice Black, some of the usages of "our + federalism" in the period 
following Frankfurter's departure from the Court in 1962 and before Younger (in 1971) seem 
to endow the phrase with the kind of entity-like status that Justice Black would later give it. 
But for the most part, the words still seem to have been used in the Frankfurter fashion, even 
though it is possible to see (in retrospect at least) how Justice Black may have been led astray. 
See, e.g., Nat'/ Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 349 (1968) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to Chief Justice John Marshall as "a principal architect of 
our federalism"); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (refer-
ring to the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as "one of the modem 
cornerstones of our federalism"); Kerv. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963) (Clark, J.) 
(observing that the decision in "Mapp [v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)] sounded no death knell 
for our federalism"). 
55. See, e.g., Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 209 (1988) (White, J., concurring) 
("for purposes of comity or 'Our Federalism'"); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 
U.S. 393, 412 n.29 (1982) ("comity ... is essential to 'Our Federalism'"); Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 71 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("the 
Court holds that ... our federalism is not implicated"); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231 
(1972) ("the 'policy' ground of 'Our Federalism'"). 
56. Eugene Rostow, Book Review, 5 Const. Comm. 193, 193-94 (1988) (reviewing 
Charles A. Lofgren, "Government From Reflection and Choice':· Constitutional Essays on 
War, Foreign Relations, and Federalism (1986)). 
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Notably, the primary materials don't seem to help out Justice 
Black very much. An unsystematic search through the ratification 
debates,s7 Madison's Notes of the conventionss and the standard 
edition of antifederalist pamphletss9 turns up nothing remotely ap-
proximating such a slogan. Nor do the standard works on the Fed-
eralist era hint at its existence. 60 Even in The Federalist itself, any 
word resembling "federalism" is missing.6t What is more, it is no 
secret that the ancient and related terms "federal" and "Federalist" 
were ones of debated meaning in those "early struggling days of our 
Union."62 In fact, by the time anyone got around to using the word 
"federalism" in the Supreme Court, counsel raised it in brief and 
used it synonymously with "consolidation,"63 the pejorative buzz-
word for over-centralization. Given this background, it seems un-
likely that such a phrase-even assuming some hypothetical 
Framer ever uttered it-would have once flourished in the sense in 
57. See generally Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions vols. 1-V 
(2d ed. 1836). 
58. See generally Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, Reported by 
James Madison (Norton, Bicentennial ed. 1987). 
59. See generally Herbert J. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist (U. Chi. Press, 
1981). 
60. See, e.g., John Chester Miller, The Federalist Era 1789-1801 (Harper, 1960); Leo-
nard D. White, The Federalists (Macmillan, 1948); see also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of 
the American Republic, 1776-1787 (U. N.C. Press, 1969). 
61. See Thomas S. Engeman, Edward J. Erler & Thomas B. Hofeller, eds., The Federal-
ist Concordance 196-97 (Wesleyan U. Press, 1988). 
62. Historians have observed that the terms were something of a political football, with 
a hotly disputed meaning during the era of ratification. The appropriation of the "Federalist" 
label by those who supported the Constitution was apparently quite a coup insofar as "fed-
eral" was initially associated with a political arrangement resembling confederation. See 
Jackson Turner Main, The AntiFedera/ists: Critics of the Constitution 1781-88 xi (U. N.C. 
Press, 1961). The defenders of the old Articles of Confederation were forced, says Main, to 
assume the "unpleasant connotation" of the negative name "Antifederalists" when the Con-
stitution's supporters grabbed the mantel "Federalist" first. But the Constitution's opponents 
were not, as he noted, "antifederal" at all: 
It was a nice piece of misdirection by the Federalists. Originally the word "federal" 
meant anyone who supported the Confederation. Several years before the Constitu-
tion was promulgated, the men who wanted a strong national government, who 
might more properly be called "nationalists," began to appropriate the term "fed-
eral" for themselves. 
Id. at viii. See also Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National Nor 
a Federal Constitution, but a Composition of Both", 86 Yale L.J. 1273, 1273-74, 1279-80 
(1977) (noting that the "founding generation" went out of its way to avoid calling the govern-
ment established by the Constitution "federal"-a term that was understood to be synony-
mous with "confederation"); Amar, 96 Yale L.J. at 1426 n.9, 1449, 1449 n.92 (cited in note 
51) (remarking on etymology of "federal" as referring to "treaty" or "convenant"). 
63. See the Passenger Coses (Smith v. Turner), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 340 (1849) (argu-
ment of defendant Turner) (referring to a congressional statute from 1799 as having been 
passed in "the heyday of Federalism and consolidation"). Compare W.B. v. Latimer, 4 U.S. 
(4 Dall.) i, vi (Del. 1788) (state court opinion referring to "the spirit of federalism" that 
animated certain legislation during the era of Confederation). 
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which Justice Black apparently understood it, only to drop out of 
sight until he later rediscovered it. 
It is tempting to conclude (if a conclusion is needed), that the 
antiquity of the word combination "our federalism" in Justice 
Black's mind was little more than a product of four decades worth 
of Frankfurter opinions. After all, no less a historian than Charles 
Beard found that one of Frankfurter's most enduring strengths lay 
in his "fancy phrase making."64 The vocabulary of federalism that 
Frankfurter introduced to his Brethren provided a way to identify 
and bring out into the open the concerns that the New Deal Court 
and its successors believed ought to govern state/federal court rela-
tions. Frankfurter obviously did not invent the term "federalism" 
or its verbal permutations, or give them the shape that they have 
now assumed. 6!5 But he introduced them to the Court's discourse at 
a time when "Federalism [was] highly fashionable among ... those 
who were on the look-out for new descriptions for rather old-fash-
ioned political concepts."66 Frankfurter thus provided a legitimat-
ing vocabulary that enabled the Court, among other things, to 
develop flexible and discretionary doctrines for federal courts to de-
cline the exercise of jurisdiction and to restrict their intervention 
into certain areas of state functioning. In so doing, he helped the 
Court engineer a fundamental shift in the role of the federal courts, 
particularly with regard to constitutional challenges to "progres-
sive" legislation and other regulatory measures. 
Justice Black's curious response to this judge-made develop-
ment, however, was to transform the new vocabulary and to treat it 
as an authentic piece of history that came from the Founders them-
selves. By invoking (and perhaps fabricating) golden-age rhetoric in 
Younger, Black made it appear that a hands-off role for the post-
Civil War federal courts was the historically accurate one, when 
just the opposite may have been true.67 The mini-revolution in judi-
cial federalism brought about by the New Deal Court and its sue-
64. See John Braeman, Thomas Reed Powell on the Roosevelt Coun, 5 Const. Comm. 
143, 152 (1988) (quoting from a letter of Beard's to T.R. Powell). 
65. The Oxford English Dictionary provides a smattering of nineteenth century uses of 
"federalism," mostly English. The earliest American entry in the Q.E.D. listing is attributed 
to Henry Cabot Lodge in a book review of John T. Morse, The Life of Alexander Hamilton 
(Little, Brown, 1876), and to a chapter therein entitled The Treasury and Federalism. See 
123 N. Amer. Rev. 113, 116 (1876). 
66. Rudolf Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe ix (Oxford U. Press, 
1945). Schlesinger observed that the word "federalism" came to be in vogue among political 
scientists around the eve of the outbreak of World War II in Europe. 
67. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases 
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636 (1979) (arguing that the equitable restraint doc-
trine of Younger v. Harris (and its progenitors) was a radical departure from prior federal 
court practice). 
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cessors, tended, like other successful revolutions, to shroud its 
innovation in the mantle of tradition. Justice Black's peculiar his-
torical claims for the slogan "Our Federalism" thus not only bear 
witness to the phenomenon of "winner's history,"6s but their ready 
acceptance suggests that the Court itself took some comfort in this 
improbable version of events. 
68. See Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1825, 1827 (1987). 
